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Economic  Implications of Wider Compensation  for "Takings."
Or, What if Agricultural Policies  Ruled  the World?
C. Ford Runge*
University of Minnesota
No matter how many times socialism fails  in practice,  a good socialist can
always  deduce a new vision of socialism that will result in a workers'  utopia.
Similarly, no matter how many federal farm programs  fail, agricultural
economists can always concoct  proposals for new government farm programs
that they promise will miraculously avoid becoming shameless  boondoggles.1
INTRODUCTION
The takings  issue has involved a search for legal criteria which  separate cases
where  compensation is justified, from those where it  is not, in regulatory actions  affecting
property.  A subsidiary  issue is the amount of this compensation in relation to the bundle
of property rights taken.  In recent court cases,  a concept  central to these  criteria is
*Professor, Departments of Agricultural  and Applied  Economics, Hubert H. Humphrey
Institute of Public Affairs, and Department of Forest Resources, University  of
Minnesota.  My thanks to Kenneth Berlin,  Daniel Farber, and Tim Searchinger for their
insights and legal observations.  Responsibility  for the views expressed  here is the
author's alone.  This paper was presented  at a Symposium,  "Windfalls and Wipeouts:
Environmental Regulation, Property and the Takings  Clause After  Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council."  Vermont Law School.  October  19,  1992.
'James  Bovard, Review  of W. W. Cochrane and  C. F. Runge, Reforming  Farm
Policy:  Toward a National Agenda.  The Wall Street Journal,  Thursday,  September 3,
1992, p. A8."reasonable investment backed  expectations."  This concept, as Professor  Michelman
noted,  has its roots in Bentham:
Property,  according  to Bentham,  is most aptly regarded  as the collection
of rules which  are presently accepted  as governing the exploitation  and
enjoyment  of resources.  So regarded,  property becomes  a "basis of
expectations" founded  on existing rules; that  is to say, property is the
institutionally  established  understanding that extant rules governing the
relationships  among men with respect to resources will continue  in
existence.2
If such expectations  are upset by regulatory action,  a basis  may exist for a "takings" claim.
The issue of expectations  is thus of special relevance  to decisions  to compensate  for such
takings.  Four aspects of these decisions  will be considered  in this article.
First, to the extent that the disappointment  of "reasonable  investment backed
expectations"  is used to justify compensation,  such a takings "test" will be continually
frustrated because expectations  (even if investment-backed)  are unobservable  and subject
to strategic misrepresentation  by self-interested  agents.
Second, this approach  to takings seems to require  an assumption  of imperfect
foresight by the person from whom property  is taken, an assumption  at odds with a
considerable  body of economic  theory advanced  by conservative  critics  of government
intervention in the name of "rational expectations."
Third, some argue that if compensation for takings is paid more widely, it would
help  "internalize" the costs of regulation,  leading  regulators to regulate  less, and thus
2Frank I.  Michelman.  "Property,  Utility and Fairness:  Comments on the Ethical
Foundations  of 'Just Compensation'  Law," Harvard  Law Review  80:6 (April,  1967): at
1211-1212.
2more "efficiently."  This claim is inconsistent  with the theory of rent-seeking  in regulation
advanced by many economists.
Fourth, the experiences  of agricultural  land use  and policy provide  a rich empirical
foundation  for examining  these issues.  Where compensation  for regulatory incursions  is
the norm, as in agricultural policy,  rational agents misrepresent  their past expectations
and maneuver to receive  compensation.  Agricultural policy shows that in  such
circumstances,  government  regulation tends to expand rather than contract,  and adverse
impacts result for both efficiency and the distribution of benefits.  If the experience  of
U.S. agricultural  policy provides  a foretaste of wider compensation  for takings,  it should
give pause to conservative  opponents  of excessive  regulation.
Reasonable  Investment Backed Expectations
Since  the 1922  Mahon case,3 the Just Compensation Clause of the Constitution4
has been subjected  to various interpretations.  In Mahon,  the Supreme  Court for the first
time extended  the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment  to require
compensation  for reductions  in property value in certain circumstances  of government
regulation.  Justice  Holmes wrote that the general test of whether compensation  is  due
depends  on what he called  "average reciprocity of advantage,"5 a somewhat  vague
concept in which  an individual's private property rights must be weighed  against the
3Pennsylvania  Coal  Co. v. Mahon.  260 U.S. 393, 413  (1922).
4"No person shall  ... be deprived  of life,  liberty,  or property, without due process  of
law; nor shall private property  be taken without just compensation."  U.S. Constitution.
Amendment  V.
SPennsylvania  Coal, 260  U.S. at. 415.
3effects of the use  of that property on his or her neighbors.6 Some of these effects  are
direct, such as polluting a neighbor's land;  others are  less direct,  such as real estate
development  that diminishes the use of property for recreation;  still other are based  on
the protection of public safety or natural resources, and the  "neighbors" affected  may be
construed as  society as a whole.7
In  1978, in Penn Central Transportation  Co. v. New York City (438  U.S.  104,  104,
1978)  the Supreme Court sharpened the economic criteria applied to the balance
between  private and public rights.  It considered whether compensation was  due after
Penn Central's permit was denied  to build a 50-story  office  building on top of Penn
Station by the zoning  authority of the  New York Landmark Preservation  Commission.
The Court considered  three factors to make  such a determination:  (1) whether the
"economic impact" of the restriction on Penn Central was sufficient to require
compensation;  (2) whether the permit denial  interfered with Penn Central's "reasonable,
investment backed  expectations;" and (3)  whether the "character of the restriction" of
zoning was  "substantially  related to the promotion  of the general welfare" in preserving
historic landmarks.8 In brief,  the Court's answer was  no, no and yes.
The second  criterion,  of "reasonable,  investment-backed  expectations,"  is the focus
6See Kenneth Berlin.  "Just Compensation Law and the Operation of Government:
The Threat  from the Supreme Court and Possible Responses."  Harvard  Environmental
Law Review  (forthcoming).
7Berlin, at  10.
8Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,  438 U.S.  104,  104, (1978);  124-138.  See
Berlin, at  14-16.
4here, and enters significantly into the much discussed  1992  Lucas case. 9 A  1988 South
Carolina statute prevented Lucas, who had invested in  1986 in beach-front property,
from building  on it because  of its proximity to the sea shore.  Lucas  argued that it had
lost all of its economic value, and that the action interfered with  his reasonable
investment-backed  expectations,  entitling  him to compensation.  Weighed  against these
private  claims were the public interests represented  by the South Carolina Coastal
Council, including  the role  of undeveloped  beach-front  as a storm barrier, as habitat for
plants and animals,  and as protection from erosion and harm to property.1 0
On appeal from the Supreme  Court of South  Carolina,  which  had denied  Lucas'
claim for compensation,  the  U.S. Supreme Court wrote five separate  opinions in the
case.  Five Justices voted to remand the case  to the  South Carolina courts for further
review, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia  (joined by Justices Rehnquist,  White,
O'Connor and Thomas).  Justice Kennedy concurred  in a separate  decision.  Justices
Blackman  and Stevens  dissented vigorously, while Justice  Souter dissented on the
technical grounds that the case was  not yet ready  for decision.
Kennedy's  concurring  opinion in Lucas was  largely based on the argument  that a
takings occurs when a regulation  "deprives the property of all value where  the
deprivation  is contrary  to reasonable  investment-backed  expectations.""  These
expectations,  Kennedy claimed  somewhat heroically,  are "based on objective  rules and
9Lucas v. South  Carolina Coastal Council,  U.S.  ,  112 S.  ct. 2886, 2892
(1992).
'0Berlin, at  17.
"Berlin,  p. 29.  Citing  112  S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy,  J.,  concurring).
5customs that can be understood  as reasonable  by all parties involved,"  and through a
review of the "whole of our legal tradition."12 By supporting regulatory  actions "without
a determination  that they were in accord with the  owner's reasonable  expectations  and
therefore  sufficient  to support a severe  restriction on specific parcels  of property,"'3
Kennedy  argued that the Supreme Court of South Carolina had erred.  In addition,  the
fact that other investors had been  allowed to build (prior to the regulation)  left Lucas to
bear an undue burden.14
Justice Scalia's  approach involved  a more oblique  appeal to expectations:  whether
regulatory restraint  "will be seen as mitigating 'harm'  to the adjacent parcels or securing
a  'benefit' for them, depending  on the  observer's evaluation  of the relative  importance of
the use  [e.g.,  erosion control, habitat protection]  the restraint favors."" 5 If the
"observer" believes  that "the state's use  interest in nurturing those resources is  so
important that any competing adjacent  uses must yield,"'6 then a takings  claim
presumably  is overridden.
But who is the "observer"?  How much or how little foresight is  attributed to this
hypothetical  observer in contrast  to the  investor  (here Lucas)  restrained by the regulatory
12112 S. Ct. at 2903.
'3Id.  at 2903-04.
'4Berlin, at 30.
"SLucas.  Id. at 2898.
16Id.
6action?' 7 The device  of the "observer"  allowed Justice  Scalia to abstract from the
fundamental  question:  whose  expectations  are to count?
In contrast to situations  involving land  (those  of "personal property"),  Scalia argued
that the buyer of,  say,  a used car should anticipate  and beware  of unpleasant regulatory
surprises:  "by reason  of the state's traditionally high degree  of control  over commercial
dealings,  [the  owner]  ought to be aware  of the possibility that new regulation will render
his property worthless  at least if the property's  only economically productive use  is sale
or manufacture  for sale."'8
Why land is set apart from other commodities,  according to Scalia,  is related to the
fact that land  is generally  bought and sold with written title (although so are used cars).
Scalia argued  that if restrictions  on its use  are not part of this  title, or included in more
general nuisance  regulation,  then they can be regarded more readily as a "surprise"
deserving of compensation.
In this sense,  Scalia's  oblique  reasoning favors  even more strongly than Kennedy's
the argument that unpleasant  surprises  resulting  from regulation  deserve compensation.
In the case  of land, what is in the title, plus  the general law of nuisance,  is  the essential
data which  a person  such as Lucas should be expected  to know.  If a later regulation
upsets  this expectation,  then  a basis for a takings claim may  exist.  Kennedy's  argument
suggests  a larger amount  of information which  someone should be expected  to know,  and
follows precedent  from the  Penn Central  case more closely.  But both arguments are
17See  Berlin, p.  33.
'8Berlin.  Id. at.  35.
7ultimately about the disappointment  of expectations,  and what  should constitute
reasonable prior knowledge.' 9
Strategic Misrepresentation  of Expectations
Assume for the moment that investors in land cannot influence  the market or
regulatory  environment;  they are both "price-takers"  and "rule takers."  What  a buyer  of
property expected  at the time he or she bought it is of course not  directly observable.  In
Scalia's narrow test, what is written on a title  (together with any liens, etc.)  and the
general  law of nuisance  constitute  a minimum of what might be expected, but it is far
less than an investor ought to know in order  to purchase property  in land.  The broader
scope of "reasonable investment backed  expectations"  used by Kennedy is still subject to
the problem that these expectations  are not observable,  and are extremely  subject to
misrepresentation.  ("I  had no idea the  state would  pass such a law!").  If an appeal is
made to what an reasonable  "observer" might have known  at the time about the
likelihood  of regulation,  according  to some  "objective  rules", the subjective  essence  of the
19Berlin  (Id, at. 38)  observes:
In today's highly regulated world,  it is hard not to expect that regulation
might restrict and  even prohibit use  in certain circumstances.  Justice  Scalia
admits as much  in the commercial,  personal property context.  Title, however,
may not reflect this  knowledge  and while the concept  of title includes
prohibitions  in the law not written explicitly  in the title,  Justice Scalia limits
these prohibitions to  ones in the relatively  cramped  law of nuisance, rather
than ones also reflected  in statutory  law passed after the passing of title, but
reflecting  a community's judgment  that the activity  is harmful.  In addition,
use of "title" rather than investment  expectations  is very favorable  to
sophisticated  developers who are treated differently than the average person
in an investment-backed  expectations test, but identically if the test is one  of
what is in the "title".
8market investment  mechanism is lost:  as leading economic  theorists of risk have
emphasized,  "It takes a difference  of opinion to make a horse race."20
One response to the argument  that expectations  are unobservable  takes the form of
what economists  call "revealed preference."  Insofar as an investor puts his money into  a
particular  parcel of land,  and could have done something else with it, he is validating his
belief in a particular expectation of both the market and regulatory environment.
However,  the fact that an expectation is "investment backed"  may or may not be
evidence  in favor of its reasonableness  and thus its candidacy  for compensation.  His
preferences  may be revealed,  but they are not necessarily "reasonable,"  and  may reflect  a
penchant for high  risks, or what financial  analysts  call  "plunging."  Many investments,
especially  in natural  resources property  such  as land potentially rich  in oil, gas,  or
minerals, are  extremely risky.  This risk arises from both natural and man-made  sources,
including  regulatory ones.21 In some such  cases,  one could do as well by random
exploration  as by forming a reasonable  expectation of which lands would yield profitable
oil, gas or minerals.22  Similar points have been made concerning  financial  assets using
darts thrown at stock market quotations in newspapers.  Expectations,  even when
investment  backed,  may reflect the judgment  of a gambler  or a fool.
20See  Michael  Rothschild and Joseph  Stiglitz.  "Increasing Risk I:  A Definition."
Journal of Economic Theory 2:3(1970):  225-243.
21Graham-Tomasi,  Runge,  and Hyde.  "Foresight and Expectations in Models of
Natural Resource  Markets."  Land Economics 62:3(1986):  234-249.
22C.  F. Runge.  "Energy Exploration on Wilderness:  'Privatization'  and Public Lands
Management."  Land Economics 60:1(1984):  56-68.
9Even worse, to the extent  that compensation  is known to be available  for potential
losses,  truncating the downside  risk of an investment,  expectations  are shifted in a way
which  actually draws  money into  higher risk ventures.  As in insurance  markets, problems
of moral hazard  and  adverse selection come  into play, as when the terminally  ill seek life
insurance, the savings  and loan industry's portfolio  shifts to highly speculative  land deals
in response to government  insurance,  or gas  and oil companies  drill too many dry holes
because of government  "depletion allowances."
Two notable  cases of what might  be called  "investment backed  plunging behavior"
motivated by the  expectation  of compensation  are flood insurance  and agricultural
subsidies.  As Farber notes:
Suppose  a landowner  is considering  a further investment in his property,  but
there is some chance that the property  will be flooded by a proposed dam.
We would  like the owner  to consider this possibility when deciding whether
to make an investment, since the investment  will be wasted if the dam is
built.  But if the owner can obtain full government  compensation  for the
flooding,  she has no reason to take  the possibility  of the dam into account.
(If the  dam is not built, the owner  can expect a return from her additional
investment, while she gets her money back from the government  if the dam is
built after all.)  So the owner  is indifferent to the possible construction  of the
dam and hence will tend to overinvest, with a consequential  loss in economic
efficiency.23
23Daniel  A. Farber.  "Public Choice and Just Compensation."  Constitutional
Commentary  9:279(1992):  279-308, at 285.  See also Robert Cooter, "Unity in Tort,
Contract, and Property:  The Model  of Precaution."  California Law Review
73:1,20(1985);  Louis Kaplow, "An Economic  Analysis of Legal Transitions."  Harvard
Law Review  99(1986);  and Lawrence Blume and Daniel L. Rubenfeld.  "Compensation
for Takings:  An Economic Analysis."  California Law Review 72(1984).
10In the case  of U.S. agricultural  subsidies, by truncating the  downside risk of losses
due to declines in market prices, the current system  of compensation  encourages  over-
investment in certain  subsidized  crops, and discourages  the development  of private
markets in crop insurance.  Since  crops are  only partially  "insured" by government
subsidy schemes  ("deficiency  payments")  crop losses often lead to calls for "disaster
relief. " 24
In summary, the attempt to define  "reasonable  investment backed  expectations" as
a basis  for takings,  either obliquely by reference  to title and nuisance  law (a la Scalia)  or
directly  (a la Kennedy),  suffers from three critical problems.  First,  what someone
expected or should have expected  at the  time is strongly subject to strategic
misrepresentation.  Second, whether an expectation  is "investment-backed"  is no
guarantee of its reasonableness.  Third, to the  extent that potential  compensation
becomes a part of expectations and investment behavior, it encourages  riskier
investments  and over-investment  in compensated  versus noncompensated  property.
Whither  "Rational Expectations"?
A large part of the theoretical  debate over macroeconomic  policy  in the  1970s  and
1980s was driven  by a group of Chicago  School theorists, led by Robert Lucas  (no
apparent relation to the South Carolina  investor),  who asserted the inutility of
24W.  W. Cochrane and C. F. Runge.  Reforming Farm Policy:  Toward  a National
Agenda.  Iowa State University  Press.  1992.  On the truncation  of risk due to
government  intervention  in agricultural  commodities  markets, see Frederick I. Johnson,
"Price  Supports Under Uncertainty:  The U.S. Oats  Market."  The American Economist
33:1(Spring,  1989):  36-44.
11government  regulation in the face of "rational expectations." 2 In brief, these theorists
argued  that if the expectations  of investors were  "rational,"26 that is, provided accurate
forecasts,  on average, given  current information, then this  foresight would  disarm
policymakers who sought to manipulate  monetary  and fiscal aggregates.  The "Lucas
critique" led to the conclusion  that economic  policy was likely to be far less effective
than generally supposed.  Rational  agents  could second guess regulators  sufficiently often
so  that activist policy should be jettisoned and policymakers should retire  to setting
monetary aggregates  as a form of stable background  noise.27
Naturally,  this line  of argument was congenial to conservatives, who placed a
greater confidence  in market forces than in bureaucrats  or legislatures.  Disregard for
the comparative  rationality  of government  is central to many arguments  for wider
compensation for takings.  Regulatory judgments  of efficiency,  according to Michelman,
"require  insight  (which legislators  and planners  posses in no greater quantity than the
rest of us) into the idiosyncratic  sources and capacities  for well-being  of the several
2See Robert  E. Lucas,  Jr.  "Some International  Evidence  on Output-Inflation
Tradeoffs."  American  Economic  Review 63(June,  1973):  326-334.  R.E. Lucas,  Jr.
"Econometric  Policy Evaluation:  A Critique."  In K. Brunner and A. H.  Meltzer  (eds.),
The Phillips  Curve and Labour Markets,  Supplement  to the Journal  of Monetary
Economics,  1976.
26See John F.  Muth.  "Rational Expectations  and the Theory of Price Movements."
Econometrica  (July,  1961):  315-335.
27See Finn Kydland and E.  C. Prescott.  "Rules Rather than Discretion:  The
Inconsistency  of Optimal  Plans."  Journal of Political Economy (June,  1977):  473-491.
12members  of society."2  Justice Scalia, writing in Lucas,  is especially  critical of legislative
findings as a basis for takings,  arguing that "since  such a justification  can be formulated
in practically  every case, this amounts to a test of whether  the legislature  has a stupid
staff."29
In response to the rational expectations  critique of government policy, defenders  of
activist monetary and fiscal  policy mounted  counterattacks  on rational  expectations
theory, showing how even with assumptions  of nearly perfect foresight, government was
needed to satisfy  certain requirements  for market-clearing.30 And in many markets,
including the market for land,  the rational expectations  hypothesis  (REH) was
unsupported  by the data.31
It is interesting  that the REH, if taken seriously,  has destructive  implications  for  a
theory  of government takings.  If private  agents  are presumed  to have sufficient
information  to disarm the actions  of government policy, including regulations  affecting
property, then they are incapable of "reasonable,  investment-backed  expectations"  which
are overturned  by regulatory policy.  In a "game" played by private  investors against
28Michelman.  "Property, Utility, and Fairness:  Comments  on the Ethical
Foundations of 'Just Compensation'  Law."  Harvard  Law Review  80:6  (April, 1967),  p.
1180.
29Lucas,  Id. at. 2898 n. 12.
"3R. Frydman and  E. S. Phelps  (eds.)  Individual  Forecasting and Aggregate
Outcomes:  "Rational Expectations" Examined.  New York:  Cambridge  University Press
(1983).
3 K. C. Moore  and W.  H. Myers.  "Predictive Econometric  Modeling  of the U.S.
Farmland  Market:  An Empirical  Test of the  Rational Expectations  Hypothesis."  Iowa
State  University.  CARD Report  133  (1986).
13government  regulators,  if the investors  can forecast the actions of the regulators  (as well
as the forecasts of others) then they are positioned not only to avoid "takings," but
actually to profit from them.32 If it is known what actions government  is likely to take,
investors  can maneuver  to advantage, whether the action is an open market operation  of
the Federal Reserve  or the zoning of land.  Hence the REH, generally  embraced  by
opponents of regulation,  has destructive  implications  for a theory of takings.  To the
extent that investors'  reasonable  expectations  are  "rational," regulation  is unlikely to
upset them, and the case for  compensation is weakened,  if not destroyed.
An alternative  approach  to expectations formation, more consistent with empirical
studies  of land  markets, is that investors  form expectations  "adaptively,"3 3 updating them
as new information becomes  available.  This approach  to expectations  is entirely
consistent with the argument for compensation.  However, if possible compensation
becomes  a part of these adaptive  expectations,  it introduces  much more serious threats
to both efficiency  and  distribution.  The most serious of these is "rent-seeking."
Rent Seeking and Compensation
At the same time that the rational expectations arguments  were being made by
members of the Chicago  School,  a complementary  group of "public choice theorists"  was
32See  R. Frydman,  G. P. O'Driscoll,  Jr. and A. Schotter.  "Rational Expectations  of
Government Policy:  An Application of Newcomb's  Problem."  Southern Journal  of
Economics 49(1982):  311-319.
33See  Moore  and Myers,  1986.  The classic theoretical treatment of adaptive
expectations is  M. Nerlove, The  Dynamics of Supply:  Estimation  of Farmers'  Response
to Price.  Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins  University Press (1958).
14developing  political-economic  arguments  against regulation.  These  arguments were
founded  in the theory of rent-seeking:  that  rational agents,  acting  as "special interests,"
would seek to steer the actions of government to their own advantage.34  Analogous  to
the price-making  powers of a monopoly,  if individuals  could become  "rule-makers"  rather
than "rule-takers,"  then by helping to write their own  rules, they could extract  "rents"
from the rest of society.
There are at least  two sources  of inefficiency  introduced by rent seeking  if
compensation  for takings were  to become widespread.  First, self-interested  agents  will
maneuver  to receive compensation,  actually  seeking to be regulated in some  cases.  One
such case, the Conservation Reserve  Program  (CRP) of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture,  will be discussed  below.  Second,  pressure groups will attempt to affect
regulations  and the flow of compensation  in ways which  benefit them, spending  resources
on this manipulation rather than on directly productive  activities.
These possibilities  do damage  to the argument  of Fischel and Shapiro, and Richard
Epstein,3 that more widespread  compensation  for takings will deter governments  from
excessive regulations.  Fischel  and Shapiro  assert that majorities tyrannize  minorities
through regulation.  Without the brake to tyranny represented by at least partial
34See  C. K. Rowley,  R. D. Tollison  and G. Tullock.  The Political  Economy of Rent
Seeking.  Boston:  Kluwer Academic Publishers.  1988.  The phrase rent seeking is
generally  attributed to an article on the use  of trade measures to extract rent through
protection at the border by A. 0.  Kreuger, "The Political  Economy of the Rent Seeking
Society," American  Economic Review 64(June,  1974):  291-303.
35W. A. Fischel  and P. Shapiro.  "A Constitutional Choice  Model of Compensation
for Takings."  International  Review of Law  and Economics  9(1989).  Richard A. Epstein.
"A Last Word on Eminent Domain."  University of Miami  Law Review 41(1986).
15compensation  for takings, politicians will pander to majorities and  overregulation  will
result.  Compensation  thus  acts for government  regulators  like tort law does to private
firms, by creating  disincentives to "externalize" costs.  However, the analogy to the role of
tort law internalizing externalities  for a private firm is inapt, for the simple  reason that
government is anything but a profit-maximizing  firm.  As Farber observes in a recent
commentary, public choice theory "gives us no reason to expect that the response  of
government officers  will mirror the responses  of the owners of a private firm.  To
determine whether  compensation requirements will lead legislators to disapprove
inefficient projects, we need  to examine  the political  dynamics  closely."36
Political  dynamics are  driven largely by interest groups.  Because  those potentially
taken  from constitute a relatively small group vis-a-vis  the public at large, their
transactions  costs of lobbying are  relatively low, and they can act collectively with greater
effect.  This principle,  revealed by actions of property inholders lobbies and  other anti-
takings  groups, is  a basic tenet  of moder  public choice  theory.37 Politicians, according
to public  choice theory, are  thus more likely to respond to small rent-seeking  groups, and
to pass laws benefitting these minorities  at the expense  of the majority, rather than vice
versa.
It is therefore  odd that Richard Epstein  has argued  (1986)  that compensation  for
36Farber, p. 289.
37See  M.  Olson.  The Logic of Collective Action.  Harvard University  Press,  1965.
Farber notes that "If public choice has any one key finding,  it is that small groups  with
high stakes have  a disproportionately  great influence  on the political process" (p. 289).
16takings will actually reduce rent seeking.38  Indeed,  an anti-compensation  doctrine
might be  considerably more effective  in reducing interest group pressure to engage  in
inefficient government  spending.  To paraphrase  Farber, if you were a free-spending
liberal contemplating land  acquisition  for public use, which interest group would you fear
most:  (1) taxpayers who are forced to bear an incremental increase  in taxes because of
the small  cost of compensation to buy out landowners?  or (2)  property owners  whose
land  is about to be seized without any compensation  at all?39 Clearly,  an
anticompensation  policy would  generate more political heat against land-use  regulation
by small  affected groups than a general policy of compensation, which would be lost  in
the sea of general tax revenues.40
What a general policy of compensation  assuredly will do, if built into the
expectations  of the affected public  (especially  small, well  positioned special interests),  is
to cause them to maneuver  to receive  this compensation where  possible, and to seek
influence  over regulations  that provide such guarantees  against losses.  No better
examples  of such behavior  exists than American  agricultural  policy, or what one
conservative  critic has called  "the farm fiasco."'
3Epstein  (1986).
39Farber, p. 293.
40In a classic theorem  on public investment,  Arrow and Lind  show that where
compensation  for losses due to public investment are passed  directly onto  taxpayers, the
risk to the average  taxpayer  of income  reductions due to the project  actually approaches
zero as the number of taxpayers becomes  large.  See  K. J. Arrow and R. C. Lind,
"Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions," American  Economic
Review  60(June,  1970):  365-78.
41James  Bovard.  The Farm Fiasco.  San Francisco:  ICS Press  (1989).
17Agricultural  Policy and  Compensation:  The Expectation  of Entitlement
Reference  has already been made  to the role  of agricultural  subsidies and crop
insurance  in altering the  investment backed expectations  of farmers.  In the case  of
agricultural  price and income  supports, farmers  are induced  to seek  the shelter of these
subsidies,  especially when prices are  low.  Because the subsidies  are paid on specific
crops  (wheat, corn,  oats,  barley,  cotton,  sugar, rice,  wool and mohair, honey,  among
others), the  choice of what to plant is guided  as much by government  programs  of
compensation  as  by market forces.  Farmers  call this  "farming the government."
It bears emphasis  that eligibility for these subsidies  is tied directly to land in the
form of crop  "base."  This base entitlement  is reflected in turn in farmland values.  In
principle,  the payment  of support  on these  "base acres"  is compensation  for the
government's  right to  restrict a percentage  of the base  ("set-aside")  from cropping,  as
well as for environmental  requirements  such  as "sodbuster"  and "swampbuster"
regulations.
What  do farmers do?  First,  they maneuver  to receive  this compensation by
"building  base" acres and buying them from others,  leading to government payments  that
have  recently run at  10-15  billion dollars a year,  but which reached a high of 26  billion
dollars  in  1986.  Second,  they organize  commodity groups whose special  interest is to
garner the  highest possible  levels of compensation  for their crop.  The corngrowers'  focus
is thus the  corn subsidy level, the wheatgrowers'  wheat,  etc.  In signing  up for these
subsidy programs,  farmers protect themselves  from downside  market risks, leading to
excessive  investments in  those crops which are  most highly subsidized.  This creates
18disincentives  to purchase  crop insurance  in private markets,  even at subsidized rates from
the government.  In effect, private insurance  markets are "crowded out" by government
compensation.
The overall effect of these  subsidies is to create  a system  of entitlements  in which
it is expected,  even demanded, that government  continue  to  regulate the agricultural
sector.  The fact that this compensation amounts to tens of billions  of dollars each year,
over 80 percent of which goes to fewer than 20 percent of the largest producers  (those
with the largest "base" acreage)  has  done almost nothing to deter the U.S. Department  of
Agriculture and the Congress  from renewing  and enlarging  many of the programs  over
time.  Given the rent-seeking behavior  of the powerful  commodity groups, the only check
on such spending in recent years  has been general budget deficits.
Not only has mandated  compensation  in agriculture,  granted  in return for
intrusions  on farmers' bundle  of property rights  in land, failed to reduce regulation
("internalizing" its costs);  in fact, it has spawned farm-level  behavior which  actually
increases the negative  external  effects  of modern farming on the environment,  while
artificially inflating farmland  values.  By concentrating  on a relatively  few crops rather
than a risk-reducing  diversification,  environmental  impacts  such as erosion and  excessive
chemical  and fertilizer  applications  have resulted.42
42National  Research Council.  Board on Agriculture.  Alternative  Agriculture.
Washington,  DC:  National Academy  Press (1989).  On the inflation of farmland values,
see Barry K. Goodwin  and Francois Ortalo-Magn6,  "The Capitalization of Wheat
Subsidies  into Agricultural  Land Values," Canadian Journal  of Agricultural  Economics
40(1992):  37-54.
19In response, the Congress  in  1985 proposed  an additional compensation measure
for farmers willing  to surrender the majority  of their  cropping  rights on lands subject to
erosion.  In return, the Conservation  Reserve Program (CRP)  paid as much  as  two times
market  prices to retire this  land from cropping  for ten years.  The CRP program  has
been criticized by a variety of studies4 3 for failing  to target this compensation to lands
most in need, and spending too much to do it.
In order to get land  into the CRP program, farmers  have been led  to misrepresent
their intentions, claiming  that they expected  to keep cropping  land even if they did not
really expect it to be profitable,  in order to qualify for the government  buy-out of these
cropping  rights.  Outside  investors purchased  farmland which was already  enrolled in the
CRP in order to receive  this stream of benefits, even through  they had no expectation of
ever farming it.  The federal government  has now removed  over 30 million acres  of land
from production for  10 years,  leading  a new set of interest groups  to dedicate  themselves
to continuing this compensation  indefinitely in order to protect the  land from future
environmental  damages.
The record  of compensation  in agriculture,  while never justified in the name of
"takings" per se, provides  a sobering  example  of how such policies function in practice.
In general, they provide incentives to rational  agents to misrepresent their expectations;
to direct investments  toward, rather than away from, regulated  schemes of compensation;
43U.S.  General Accounting  Office.  Farm Programs:  Conservation  Reserve Program
Could be Less Costly and More  Effective.  GAO/RCED-90-13.  Washington,  D.C.
(November,  1989);  S. J. Taff and C. F. Runge.  "Wanted:  A Leaner and Meaner CRP."
Choices, First Quarter (1988).
20to expand through  special interests the  scope of this regulation;  and to increase  benefits
flowing  to those who can capture  the regulatory process.  If this is not what advocates  of
wider  compensation for takings  have in mind,  then agriculture provides a bitter foretaste
of where such policies  might lead.
21